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A major conflict in the Caucasus region since 1988, the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh 
remains undetermined.​  ​Life was peaceable for citizens living under the Soviet Union rule 
(USSR), until tensions arose once the predominantly Armenian region voiced their desire for 
independence from Azerbaijan’s Karabakh Oblast.   The effort to secede from the Soviet Union 1
and unify with Armenia did not seem to be a problem until a bloody war broke out.  With over 
ten thousand dead and one million Azeris displaced by 1992, the bloody massacre erupted into a 
five year conflict that involved ethnic cleansing.  By 1994, an estimated 30,000 people were dead 
and with the help of third-party intervention by Russia, the signatories agreed upon full 
cease-fire and cessation of hostilities. ,   Since then, ​Independence has been granted to 2 3
Nagorno-Karabakh,​ but the territory remains contested as both Armenia and Azerbaijan assert 
ownership of the territory.  For this reason, all efforts by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group to mediate the conflict have failed and thus, 
serves reason as to why it is termed the​ “frozen conflict.”   This intergovernmental group is 4
co-chaired by Russia, France, and the United States, yet the issue still remains similar to other 
post-Soviet regions such as Moldova and Ukraine.   Although a massive war resulting in victory 5
or defeat for either side has not yet occurred, many casualties have taken place in the last 
twenty-nine years. The enmity continues. 
1 Coffey, Luke. “The Nagorno–Karabakh Conflict: U.S. Vigilance Required | the Heritage Foundation.” April 6, 
2016. Accessed February 6, 2017. 
http://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict-us-vigilance-required. 
2 Stuart J. Kaufman, Ethnic Fears and Ethnic War In Karabagh, October 1998, accessed February 04, 2017, 
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/ruseur_wp_008.pdf. 
3 1994 Ceasefire agreement- MFA NKR, May 11, 1994. 
4 “Explainer: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” August 5, 2014, accessed February 04, 2017, 
http://www.rferl.org/a/background-nagorno-karaback/26514813.html. 
5 “Why the OSCE Keeps Failing to Make Peace in Nagorno-Karabakh,” National Interest, May 11, 2016, accessed 
February 04, 2017, 
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-osce-keeps-failing-make-peace-nagorno-karabakh-16161. 
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Today, the OSCE’s decision remains in tact.  Seven regions in the territory, composing 
approximately twenty percent of the Nagorno-Karabakh region, remain under Armenian control 
because of the 1994 ceasefire agreement.  The Armenian people argue that they hold rights to 
this mountainous region and vice versa.  The Azeri people wish to also regain control of what 
they believe is rightfully theirs, namely the seven regions that have been given to their opposition 
based off the OSCE’s decision.  Many argue that the unsuccessfulness of the Minsk Group ​lies 
within their neutral stance, which in result maintains the status quo.​  However, from the 
perspective of the two regions, the Armenians are content with the existing state of affairs, given 
that any other settlements between the two regions will most likely involve a returning of some 
regions that Armenia has sovereignty over.   In sum, “Armenia wants Nagorno-Karabakh to 6
become independent and rejects any deal on an autonomous status for the region, while 
Azerbaijan wants to preserve its territorial integrity and similarly declines any proposal which 
might lead to the independence of the region.”   Herein, the dispute is characterized as 7
self-determination versus territorial integrity, which enclave leader Arkady Gukasyan  has 8
repeatedly made mention of.  In response to Gukasyan, Azerbaijan’s president Ilham Aliyev 
stated: “We will never reconcile with the seizure of our territories. The conflict can only be 
resolved on the basis of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan within its 
internationally recognized borders.”   Ironically, this was not the case under the Soviet rule.  This 9
conflict was initially instigated from Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, who decided that ancient 
6 Grono, Magdalena. “What’s Behind the Flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh?” April 3, 2016. Accessed February 4, 
2017. http://blog.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/2016/04/03/whats-behind-the-flare-up-in-nagorno-karabakh/. 
7 Farid Shafiyev, “Ethnic Myths and Perceptions as a Hurdle to Conflict Settlement: The Armenian-Azerbaijani 
Case,” The Caucasus and Globalization 1, no. 2 (2007). 
8 S​elf-declared president of Nagornyy Karabakh 
9 Elmar Mammadyarov, September 30, 2015. 
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Artsakh (now Nagorno-Karabakh)  ought to be under Azerbaijani rule in the 1920’s-- as we 10
know it today.  With a ninety-nine percent vote for independence, Nagorno-Karabakh declared 
and successfully gained its independence from the USSR and since then, has desired to reunite 
with Armenia.   This desire has been countered by Azerbaijani desire to re-validate Stalin’s 11
decision and ultimately, take control of the territory.   In terms of self-determination, Nagorno- 12
Karabakh continues to bring attention to the 1978 CIA report on Soviet minorities, that states: 
The inhabitants of another turbulent area in the Caucasus, the Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast, are able to make a better argument that their oblast should 
be transferred from one republic to another. The Karabakh Oblast is part of 
Azerbaydzhan, yet over 80 percent of its population is Armenian and it lies close 
to the border of the Armenian Republic.   13
The report further confirms that not only Nagorno- Karabakh is historically Armenian, 
but it  has been during the USSR. 
As known, the root of all unresolved conflicts is the reluctance of the two parties to 
conjoin in efforts of reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement.​  In the case of the 
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the first step that has been determined by the OSCE to render 
progress in the negotiation process, is for Armenia to take the first step and withdraw from 
10 Nagorno-Karabakh is also referred as the Artsakh republic, because of Artsakh’s medieval history dating back to 
2nd century BC. 
11 ​“Armenian National Committee of America,” ANCA, accessed February 19, 2017, 
https://anca.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Artsakh_Talking_Points.pdf. 
12 Ibid. 
13 S. Chouldjian, Elizabeth. 
“Https://anca.Org/press-Release/declassified-Documents-Reveal-Long-Standing-Cia-Recognition-That-Nagorno-Ka
rabagh-Is-Part-of-Armenia/.” ​DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS REVEAL LONG-STANDING CIA RECOGNITION 
THAT NAGORNO KARABAGH IS PART OF ARMENIA - Armenian national committee of America​ . Washington, 
DC: Armenian National Committee of America, 2003. 
https://anca.org/press-release/declassified-documents-reveal-long-standing-cia-recognition-that-nagorno-karabagh-is
-part-of-armenia/. 
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territorial ownership in order to sit with a clean start.  If this is accomplished with success, the 
parties would then be able to address their issues and interests, while addressing the dark past 
that they have suffered together.  Furthermore, in order to better understand the cross-cultural 
conflict at hand, one must not stereotype, but rather make isomorphic attributions  to then 14
understand the behavior of another individual in a positive light.  This ​entails each culture's way 
of processing information​, as well as their worldview and values.   Values are in a sense the 15
navigation that directs cultures to act a certain way.  It defines what is good and what is evil, 
what is right and what is wrong.  As Carley H. Dodd so perfectly articulates: "An understanding 
of values, therefore, can pinpoint the differences between two individuals from serpent cultures-- 
and intercultural communications can proceed from an understanding of those differences."  16
These values are rooted from cultural and national identities, which are defined by shared 
history, cultural personality, religious beliefs, nonverbal behavior, spatial relation, time, 
nationalism, and even ethnocentrism.   Such elements play a significant role in creating a social 17
structure that a culture ultimately associates their identity with. 
As a culture, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis are collectivistic, nationalistic, 
polychronic, have high context, high uncertainty avoidance, and high power distance.  In terms 
of time orientation, both cultures are polychronic, meaning they take in and process multiple 
information simultaneously.   In the case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute over 18
Nagorno-Karabakh, both cultures should aim to make sense of the other, as explained by the 
14 In essence, we put ourselves in the shoes of the “other” (Ackerman, 30). 
15 "A conception of an individual or group of individuals that is either 'implicit or explicit of the desirable, which 
influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of actions'" (Ackerman, 43). 
16 ​Grant Ackerman, Cross-Cultural Negotiations and Dispute Resolution (East Brunswick, NJ: University Publishing 
Solutions, LLC, 2003), 33. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Ackerman, 26. 
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attribution theory.  Although there is not great differences in cultural terms relating to power 
distance, context, and uncertainty avoidance, by viewing the other party as rational, logical, and 
meaningful to the other party, cross-cultural management in this conflict will be more effective.   19
Moreover with cultural, historical, and religious implications behind this nearly 
three-decade conflict, it is important to dissect each culture to the core.  Through quantitative 
data, the cultural zone that the South Caucasus are characterized by, namely Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, identify with a collectivistic state of mind. ,   This collectivism is explained by 20 21
their familiocentric reliance that traditional cultures tend to identify with.  Despite the fact that 
many similarities exist between these two collectivistic, past-oriented culture, nationalistic 
cultures, the most important of these intercultural elements, as the past has revealed to us, is and 
has been religion.  The politicization of religion is a factor which may hinder the process of 
reconciliation to take place.   Religious nationalists tend to view their "religious traditions as so 22
closely tied to their nation or their land that any threat to one of these is a threat to one's 
existence and identity."   In turn, this can be an impediment-- obstructing the reconciliation 23
process and creating false perception that the matter before the partisan forces is irreconcilable.  
19 Ackerman, 30. 
20 Collectivistic cultures focus more on community, rather than the individual. They are more dependent and 
relationship-focused, which is why they are succumb to groupthink. In addition, collectivistic cultures are more 
risk-averse than individualistic groups. Zachariah, Michael. Lecture, Straus Institute of Dispute Resolution, Malibu, 
CA, January 14, 2017. 
21 Alexander Agadjanian, Evert van der Zweerde, and Ansgar Jödicke, Religion, Nation and Democracy in the South 
Caucasus (UK: Routledge, 2014). 
22 ​Jeong, 7. 
23 “Religion and Religious Institutions in the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict: Does the Religious Factor Play 
a Role?,” July 23, 2016, accessed February 05, 2017, 
http://www.religions.am/eng/articles/religion-and-religious-institutions-in-the-nagorno-karabakh-conflict
_--does-the-religious-factor-play-a-role/. 
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Particularly in the South Caucasus region, religion is an identity factor that one is "born 
into," rather than a choice of social status.   In regards to Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, the 24
Armenians pride themselves in being the first to accept Christianity; as for the Azeris, while 
there is no national religion, approximately ninety-seven percent are Shia Muslim.   Due to 25
atheistic values and principles promoted under Soviet rule, religion was not a bone of contention. 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, religious differences began to be apparent as they once 
were.  Analogously, nationalism functions like religion.  Both religion and nationalism direct an 
individual to place their "faith in some external power, feelings of awe and reverence, and 
ceremonial rites" (e.g. a flag).   As stated by Thomas de Waal, the Nagorno-Karabakh “region 26
has been a crossroads and meeting place between Christianity and Islam, Armenians, 
Azerbaijanis.”   This intersection touches upon an anthropological framework: the way each 27
culture views human nature, the relationship of man to nature, the relationship of man to man, 
the temporal focus of life, and even the modality of man’s activities.   These cultural approaches 28
differ greatly as followers of Islam see human nature as intrinsically good with no original sin, 
whereas the Christian struggles with the consequences of original sin.  These religious 
differences inevitably shape Muslims and Christians view reconciliation.  To add, the temporal 
focus of both Armenians and Azerbaijanis alike creates a contentious climate where both parties 
look to the past with distaste towards one another. 
24 Slavica Jakelic, ​Collectivistic Religions ​ (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2010), 1.  
25 “Azerbaijan,” The world Factbook — central intelligence agency, January 1, 2010, accessed February 04, 2017, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/aj.html. 
26Rogers Brubaker, “Language, Religion and the Politics of Difference,” Nations and Nationalism 19, no. 1 
(November 21, 2012), doi:10.1111/j.1469-8129.2012.00562.x. 
27Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War (New York: New York 
University Press, 2003). 
28 Ackerman, 44. 
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With that being said, it is pertinent to understand the sociocultural layers that need to be 
resolved in this negotiation.   The complexity of cross-cultural ideologies can only be 29
understood through cultural norms, as “collective sentiments are represented in a diverse set of 
understandings about the outside world.”   Unlike an individualistic society where the problem 30
is associated with the individual alone, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as both a collectivistic and 
high-context culture, are unable to detach the cultural conflict at hand from their relationships 
with one another.  In addition to their high-contextual approach to life, both indelible memories 
and myths of the past play a fundamental role.  With accumulated animosity from past relations, 
collective memories of the past push both parties to rely on symbols that are learned and shared.
  Ipso facto, symbols may reinforce divisiveness that can further inhibit reconciliatory measures 31
on both ends. 
While religion plays a tremendous role, both parties cling forth to the historical aspect of 
the conflict, rather than issues of ethnic and religious identity.  Historically, Armenians have 
associated Azerbaijani people with Turkish people.  The correlation that Armenians make of the 
"other" is the reason why they view them in a fearful manner.  This fear exists as a result of the 
1915 Armenian Genocide, a conflict that has not been recognized by major superpowers such as 
United States and Turkey.  In result, “Historical seeds of the enmity paved the way for the 
crystallization and perpetuation of the conflict.”   Additionally, because Armenia is ancient and 32
predates the birth of Christ, they view themselves as superior to the Azerbaijani people-- given 
29 Ho-Won Jeong, Conflict Management and Resolution: An Introduction (London: Taylor & Francis, 2009). 
30 Ibid., 32.  
31 Ackerman, 4.  
32 Ahmet Dogru, Nationalism and Democratization Process in Armenia: Impacts of the Nagorno-Karabakh Issue 8, 
no. 16 (2015), accessed February 04, 2017, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/73882. 
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that the Azerbaijani nation does not have an extensive medieval history as Armenia does.  It is 
vital to keep the historical background of the situation in mind, since mediators must be aware of 
psychological factors that can prevent a constructive mediation to take place.   33
With a history of antipathy, both cultures hold steadfast to the hate trickled down from 
generation to generation.  This hate is not only transferred generationally, but is also taught in 
educational systems, as well as influenced by the media and government.  Rhetoric surrounding 
this conflict advances both parties to continue forth the hate that leaves the conflict in a 
deadlocked situation.  The wrongful rhetoric used by the media and the government mobilizes 
nationalist sentiments that religion has instilled too, aforementioned.   This form of rhetoric is 34
one that has ethnocentrism rooted at its core.  It creates a perceptual frame of reference that is 
filtered through negative views of the other.   This greatly centers on the superiority of the "us" 35
versus "them" attitude that we continually see from ruling parties on both ends.  As Ackerman 
explains, nationalist cultures tend to carry forth these judgmental attitudes that lead to the 
continual reinforcement of negative stereotypes.   36
For this purpose, there ought to be a reconciliation committee that seeks to decipher how 
the opposing parties can find a common ground, despite the great debate surrounding a history of 
bygone events.  As a Stanford Fulbright student states, the Nagorno-Karabakh mediations have 
only sought to tackle issues on a “super-structural level, addressing only the immediate time and 
territory of the hostilities. Thus, these negotiations have confined themselves to the narrowest 
possible framework, reaching only the proverbial tip of the iceberg, and leaving off the agenda 
33 Ackerman, 93. 
34 Hasmik Grigoryan, Nagorno Karabakh as a Diversionary Conflict, May 30, 2016,. 
35 ​Ackerman, 10.  
36 Ibid.  
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the deeper conflicting patterns of behavior and strategic thinking of the various parties to the 
conflict.”   Once there is a mutual agreement about the past, or at least a decision to close the 37
book of the past, both parties will be able to proceed and solve matters of the present.  Tackling 
the problems of the past and the present will pacify both parties, creating a new era of security 
and collaborative efforts.  Regardless of the points of success that past negotiations and 
mediations have attained, through a "dynamic integration process where national security, 
democracy, and prosperity are simultaneously enhanced..must happen through co-operation 
rather than through external pressure."   Straying away from forceful approaches and allowing 38
the parties to engage on their own terms may cause positive combined efforts.  Realistically, this 
cannot be achieved in a short period of time.  Not to mention, international institutions that have 
been present in the past must continue to promote reconciliatory measures between the two 
parties.  This includes the OSCE, NATO's Partnership for peace, the European Union and its 
N​eighbourhood Policy​, but again, before such intervention, a willingness to participate on a 
regional level must occur.    39
Conclusively, in order for the South Caucasus to preserve a sense of harmony across the 
region, the resolution of this geographical and ethnic conflict is imperative.  Many geopolitical 
concerns stem from this issue alone.  If ceasefire agreements are encroached upon by either 
party, a full-fledged war will result.  Despite the fact that many countries around the world do 
not take heed to this small region, it can definitely be a “domino destabilization,” yielding 
atrocious results, “with the US/NATO and Russian faceoff representing the most ominous 
37 Dogru. 
38 ​ Abasov, Ali and Haroutiun Khachatrian. ​THE KARABAKH CONFLICT Variants of Settlement: Concepts and 
Reality​ . 2006,. http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatrian.pdf. 
39 Ibid. 
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outcome for the entire world.”   With the amount of parties involved-- such as Georgia, Russia, 40
Iran, Turkey-- there are serious geopolitical concerns to be addressed.  As stated by Sergi 
Kapanadze, a Tbilisi State University professor, the Karabakh conflict “threatens the stability of 
the strategic Caucasus region which is a transit route of Caspian oil and gas to European markets 
that bypasses Russia.”   With this in mind, cultural differences should be taken into account so 41
that a long-desired amicable resolution may be reached.  A mediator should come before the two 
parties, knowing that prejudices, stereotypes, fears, and interests must be addressed.   Through 42
mediation, both parties can trump power distinctions and the optimal result they both intend to 
achieve. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 “Nagorno-Karabakh and the Domino Destabilization of Disaster (II),” Open Research Journal, August 8, 2014, 
accessed February 04, 2017, 
http://orientalreview.org/2014/08/08/nagorno-karabakh-and-the-domino-destabilization-of-disaster-ii/. 
41 “Azerbaijan and Armenia Clashes Continue for Third Day,” The Guardian (The Guardian), April 5, 2016, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/apr/04/azerbaijan-and-armenia-clashes-continue-for-third-day. 
42 Ackerman, 92. 
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